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willing seller. Earnings would be taken over a reasonably long period and ad-
justed to a common level.
No attempt is made here to justify these principles or bases from a philosophi-
cal or jurisprudential view-point: It is merely desired to point out that, no matter
what the actual measure of compensation today for nationalization of property,
any valid and lasting measure of compensation must take into consideration the
factors set out above.
EARL A. SNYDER*
*A.B. '39 Indiana University; LL.B. '47, Indiana University, Member of Indiana Bar;
Major, USAF; Attached to Office of Judge Advocate General, USAF.
Cruel and Unusual Punishments
A punishment is regarded as a penalty imposed by authority on one who
transgresses the law. Its infliction is consequent upon the evil act of the offender.
As a sanction it must operate in opposition to the malfactor's will by effectively
depriving him of some good, such as life, integrity of the body, liberty, or exterior
goods. The deprivation of any of these goods is a penalty. Hence, punishments
are often classified as loss of life, loss of bodily integrity, loss of freedom of spon-
taneous action, or loss of external goods, e.g. riches, country, and fame.
While the above are generally thought to be substantial deprivations and,
therefore, suitable punishments, their intensity of application has varied through
the centuries. Under the Old Law of the Hebrews, for example, the means of in-
flicting punishment was the lex talionis, or law of retaliation: a method of mutila-
tion exacting an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life.
In the past 200 years alone, there have been at least three schools of penal
philosophy, each with varying concepts of punishment. The first was the classical
school. When, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, men were keenly
aware of the philosophical concept of the freedom of the will, penalties were
immutable. The individual breaking the rule did so of his own free will, and if
apprehended and convicted, paid the penalty. Hence, it was felt by those of the
classical school that the punishment for the same crime should always be the same
because the moral responsibility was the same.1 From this there developed the
second or neoclassical school. While recognizing freedom of the will, it also
recognized that education, heredity, and other factors may affect freedom of
choice, thereby lessening responsibility. The classical theory of punishment under-
went a gradual change, so that the penalty for crime soon came to be graded in
proportion to the individual's amount of freedom and responsibility. The third or
determinist theory denies freedom of the will. If followed to its logical conclusion,
1 Orme v. Rogers, 32 Ariz. 502, 260 Pac. 199 (1927).
this position says that w act, not because we will, but because we must. Under
this theory, punishment :s just, when it realizes that the offender is a member of
society who, through untfortunate circumstances, has become abnormal. Society
must treat him as diseas d, return him to normalcy, and when this has been ac-
complished, restore him to his place in that society.2 Each school has been ap-
proved; each has been r,.jected.
Thus, we see that punishments, while classified basically as losses of life,
bodily integrity, freedon of spontaneous action, or external goods, may vary in
application and in severi y. In England during the Revolution of 1688, the framers
of the Bill of Rights we re so impressed by the cruelty of torture that they estab-
lished the initial prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.3
This was an admonition to the national government, to warn it against such
violent proceedings as had taken place in the arbitrary reigns of some of the
Stuarts.4 In 1791, this clause in the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the
Constitution of the United States of America by the Eighth Amendment.
II
Which punishments are cruel and unusual? Admittedly, the answer is fraught
with some uncertainty. Madame Defarge's English counterparts of the seventeenth
century watched blinding, burning, boiling, and scourging while sipping tea. The
curious peeped at the skulls at Temple Bar for the nominal charge of one half
penny. Thus, a punishment which is not considered cruel in one era, may be con-
sidered cruel in the next era due to the fact that personal scales of value change
from generation to generation. In this field it must be recognized that "thinking
makes it so." There are, however, certain fundamental conclusions connected with
the punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment which should be pointed out.
In general, the Eighth Amendment restricts the form of punishment rather
than its duration.5 As a result, it has long been a precept of justice that the pun-
ishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense. 6 To
determine if there is a proper proportion between the punishment and the of-
fense, the court looks either to adjudicated cases and to whether the penalty shocks
the moral sense of reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the cir-
cumstances.' If a punishment is manifestly out of all proportion to the offense, or
has long been disused because of its cruelty so as to have become "unusual," then
the penalty will probably be held unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.8
2 ibid.
3 Bill of Rights, 1 Will. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. 2 (1688).
4 Story on the Constitution, (5th ed., 1891) p. 650.5 Kistler v. State, 190 Ind. 149, 129 N. E. 625 (1921).
6 Weems v. U. S., 217 U. S. 349 (1910).7 48 W. Va, L. Q. 63 (1941).
8 Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America,
(2d ed., 1891) p. 307.
The duration of a punishment may be considered by a court if it is manifestly
unjust. Thus, 800 years imprisonment and one-half million dollars fine has been
held to be in violation of the Constitutional provisionY
Within the pale of due process, the legislature has the power to define
crimes and fix punishments.10 Consequently, any statutory punishment based on
the common law probably would not be construed as cruel or unusual in the
Constitutional sense; and "probably any new statutory offense may be punished
to the extent and in the mode permitted by the common law for offenses of
similar nature."11 It has been said that it would be an extraordinary case, indeed,
in which the judgment of the legislature would be brought into question.' 2
With these principles in mind, let us consider the basic deprivations indi-
vidually.
Today there is undoubtedly agreement on the fact that death by crucifixion,
breaking at the wheel, burning at the stake, and the like are cruel and unusual
punishments. Why? Simply because they involve torture or lingering death; they
imply something barbarous, something brutal, something more than the ending
of life. The death penalty is not forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 13 But it
appears that loss of life must be accomplished through relatively instantaneous
means. Hence, death by hanging,14 shooting,'" electrocution, 6 or lethal gas1 7 are
not forbidden by the Constitution of the United States.'
A unique case was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in
1946, by Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, Sheriff. The petitioner, having
been convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Louisiana court, was
placed on the electric chair. Through some defect in the mechanism, an electrical
current sufficient to cause death did not pass through Francis' body. After re-
moval from the chair, he was returned to prison, and a warrant for a subsequent
execution was issued. In reviewing the case the Supreme Court said:
Even the fact that petitioner has already been subjected to a current of elec-
tricity does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitu-
tional sense than any other execution. The cruelty against which the Constitu-
tion protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt con-
summation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an element of cruelty to
a subsequent execution. There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor
any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution. . . . We cannot
9 State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 Pac. 596 (1909).
10 State v. Woodard, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S. E. 385 (1910).
11 Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, (7th ed., 1903) p. 472.
12 See note 8 supra.
"aIn re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890).
14Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417 (1914).
15 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1878).
16 McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155 (1891).
1
7 State v. Gee ion, 46 Nev. 418, 211 Pac. 676 (1923).
18 See note, 30 A. L. R. 1452.
agree that the hardship imposed upon petitioner rises to that level of hardship
denounced as denial of due process because of cruelty.19
Loss of bodily integrity by the strict talion is, of course, forbidden as cruel
and unusual punishment. As pointed out by one writer,
.. it seems a little harsh to pluck out a man's eye or cut off his arm or leg,
and then cast him forth to find a living, since it is rather a difficult task to
garner a living even with all one's members intact.
20
A decent respect for the body, and a keen appreciation of man as an individual
and social being must be kept in mind.21 What right, then, has the legislature to
proscribe such mutilations as sterilization or asexualization as punishments for
sexual crimes? Do these constitute cruel and unusual punishments? The answers
are not in harmony. In advocating sterilization, one court has said that, as the
death penalty is imposed in some jurisdictions for the crime of rape, it cannot
be cruel to impose a penalty less than death.22 On the other hand, in rejecting
sterilization, another court said that while vasectomy was no more cruel than
branding, slitting a tongue, or amputating a finger, yet, "when resorted to as
punishment, it is ignominious and degrading, and in that sense cruel."2
It should also be noted that the use of sterilization and asexualization as
preventatives is seriously questioned.2 ' In this regard, the following is an excellent
thought to keep in mind when considering the problem:
Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects;
therefore, where no crime has taken place and there is no cause present for
grave punishment, they can never directly harm, or tamper with the integrity
of the body, either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason. St.
Thomas teaches this when, inquiring whether human judges for the sake of
preventing future evils can inflict punishment, he admits that the power
indeed exists as regards certain other forms of evil, but justly and properly
denies it as regard:i the maiming of the body. 'No one who is guiltless may
be punished by a human tribunal either by flogging to death, or mutilation,
or by beating.'2 5
Certain punishments may be considered "mutilations" by one class of people,
but not by others. A :subject of the emperor of China brought an action in a
California court to recover damages for the loss of his queue. It appears that the
plaintiff was imprisoned for a misdemeanor, and his queue cut, in compliance
with a jail ordinance directing that the hair of inmates be cut within one inch
of the scalp. The loss of the queue is regarded by Chinamen as a mark of disgrace,
and according to their religion, may subject them to misfortune and suffering
after death. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages, since the
cutting was unnecessary and unjust.2 6
19329 U. S. 459, 464 (1947).
20 Friel, Punishment in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, (1939) p. 56.
21 ibid.2 2 State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912).
22Michle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (9th Cir. 1918).2 4 State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 668 (1931).
25 Pope Pius IX, Cansti Connubii, quoting Summa Theo., 2a, 2ae, q. 108 a 4 as 2 um.
26 Ho Al Kow v. Nanan, 5 Sawy. 552 (1879).
The deprivation of freedom of spontaneous action by imprisonment is not
per se cruel and unusual; "in fact, it is the most common mode of punishment
in all civilized countries."27 Nor is imprisonment at hard labor in violation of the
Constitutional prohibition.2" It has been held, however, that solitary confinement,
if not provided for by statute, is an unusual punishment.29
While a fine is one form of punishment, it is not within the scope of this
article to discuss the vast subject of excessive fines.
As to loss of country it has been generally said that banishment from a state
is beyond the power of the court as prohibited by public policy. 0 Similarly, any
punishment which tends to defame a person in the eyes of his associates, such as
placing in a ducking stool and plunging a person three times in water for the
offense of being a common scold, has been held to be cruel, unusual, and
ludicrous.21
III
The history of law shows that crimes have been "more effectively prevented
by the certainty, than by the severity of punishment."' 2 To ascertain, therefore,
what is prohibited by the provision against cruel and unusual punishments in
the Eighth Amendment, one must consider:
1. whether the punishment has ever been adjudicated as cruel and unusual when
applied as a penalty to the same or a similar offense;
2. whether the form of the punishment is so manifestly cruel as to shock the
moral sense of reasonable men;
3. whether the penalty is properly proportioned to the offense
a. in form
b. in duration;
4. whether the penalty is similar to the common-law penalty for the same or
similar offense.
Blackstone pointed out that as atonement for crime must be left to the just
determination of the Supreme Being, the final cause of human punishment is as a
precaution against future offenses of the same kind."3 But he did not forget to
add that "though the end of punishment is to deter men from offending, it never
can follow from thence, that it is lawful to deter them at any rate, and by any
means."'
34
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2
7 Ex parte O'Shea, 11 Cal. App. 558, 105 Pac. 776 (1909).
2"State v. Gillmore, 88 Kan. 835, 129 Pac. 1123 (1913).
2 Williams v. State, 125 Ark. 287, 188 S. W. 826 (1916).
"°People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N. W. 95 (1930).
31 James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & R. 220.
324 Blackstone's Commentaries, *17.
"3 ibid. *11.
'4ibid. *10.
